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Literature Review:  
The Efficacy of Foreign Aid in Counterterrorism Efforts 
 
Introduction 
For the past twenty years, the United States, as well as much of the developed world, has 
been involved in the War on Terror with the stated objective of defeating terrorist groups that 
threaten domestic security. To this end, the United States has committed to the strategies of 
direct military intervention in a handful of countries, and indirect foreign aid to the regimes 
hosting terrorist groups in a much larger set of nations, most of which are in the Middle East, 
South Asia, and Africa. Since 9/11, the aggregate amount of foreign aid globally has soared: 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) funds, which are defined by the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (hereafter OECD) as aid intended for economic 
development from Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members, have increased from 
$75.8 billion in 2000, before 9/11, to $145.3 billion in 2019 (OECD 2020). 
Because of the large amount of money that is being distributed as foreign aid, it is all the 
more important to investigate its effectiveness and impact. Therefore, in this literature review I 
look at the following questions: ​What is the primary objective of counterterrorism foreign aid? 
And ​What determines counterterrorism foreign aid allocation?​ Additionally, I ask: ​Is foreign aid 
effective in counterring terrorism? ​And ​What determines its effectiveness? 
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As I approach writing this paper, I am skeptical of claims that foreign aid is an effective 
counterterrorism tool, simply because we’ve employed this strategy around the world, and 
especially in the Middle East, for my entire life, with little long-term success. I am much more 
inclined to believe international relations theorists who argue that foreign aid is driven more by 
realpolitiks and Machiavellianism—that foreign aid is a tool to increase the donor nation’s 
influence within—and over the regime of—the recipient country. I also expect that foreign aid 





Aid Allocation and the Objective of Aid 
In the post-9/11 period, counterterrorism foreign aid dramatically increased around the 
world, as evidenced by the rise in ODA funding (OECD, 2020). However, on a much more 
individualized scale, there is little evidence that aid budgets correlate with the aggregate number 
of terrorist incidents; according to Dreher & Fuchs (2011: 358), “There is no evidence that 
donors augmented their foreign aid budgets in years with particularly large numbers of attacks or 
cut aid when terror incidents have begun ebbing.” Furthermore, countries that host terror groups 
are no more likely than other countries to receive foreign aid. That being said, if host countries 
do receive foreign aid, it is more likely that they will receive comparatively larger amounts of aid 
(Dreher & Fuchs 2011: 358). 
As counterterrorism aid allocation is not determined by terrorist incidents, it seems 
unlikely that the primary goal of foreign aid is to effectively counter terrorism; if 
counterterrorism is, in fact, the objective of foreign aid, then it is likely that aid is being allocated 
extremely ineffectively. In addition to terrorism not being a determinant, humanitarian need, as 
indicated by life expectancy, is not related to economic development aid allocation, and it does 
not affect the amount of aid that is allocated (Bueno de Mesquita & Smith 2009: 336).  
Instead, many argue that aid allocation is determined by the donor regime’s political 
rather than humanitarian, developmental, or counterterrorism objectives (Alesina & Dollar 
2000). Even democratic states, which disproportionately are the donor parties in the foreign aid 
equation, utilize aid allocation as a tool for achieving personal and political goals (Aning 2010). 
These donor regime objectives include shoring up domestic electoral support, especially in the 
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run-up to elections, and solidifying the domestic economy (Tahir 2017: 114). Not only are these 
goals accomplished through foreign aid, but also by instigating or expanding diversionary wars 
(Tahir 2017: 114). 
Finally, another explanation for foreign aid allocation is that it is used by donor countries 
to increase their political, economic, and military influence in the recipient country and the 
surrounding region. This theory is supported by evidence that aid is often given to countries that 
are economically and strategically important to the donor, regardless of their actual need for aid 
(Bueno de Mesquita & Smith 2009: 336).  
In many cases, nations that host terrorist groups are unable to militarily defeat their 
insurgencies. In the absence of foreign aid, the regime then must decide between either 
prolonging the military conflict, which damages and destabilizes their state, or negotiating with 
terrorist groups—most regimes choose the latter option as it ensures their continued survival. 
This option often requires that the regime make a few key policy concessions to the insurgents, 
likely including increased hostility toward U.S. foreign policy. However, if the United States 
intervenes on behalf of the regime, either directly or indirectly, the regime’s survival is ensured, 
and there is no incentive to negotiate with insurgents (Bapat, 2011: 22). Thus, U.S. intervention 
prolongs military conflict and may make eventual resolution less peaceful and more difficult 
(Bapat 2009: 23). This scenario demonstrates how donor countries use foreign aid to influence 
recipient regimes and how this affects conflict with terrorist groups. 
Interactions between donor and recipient regimes occur within a system of aid-for-policy 
deals, where both actors politically gain in their respective domestic spheres. According to 
Bueno de Mesquita & Smith (2009: 310), when foreign aid is allocated, it is allocated in 
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exchange for policy concessions, making aid-for-policy deals “a rational allocation of resources 
and effort by both recipients and donors that advance the interests of political elites in each 
nation.” 
For democratic donor regimes, such as the United States, foreign aid is a tool to achieve 
policy objectives that constituents demand, such as protecting and establishing pro-American 
regimes around the world, especially in strategically important regimes like the Middle East. 
Simply put, aid allocation depends on the demands of constituents, as one of the primary goals of 
democratic regimes is to stay in power, and in democracies this is achieved by winning elections. 
Autocrats, in contrast, rely on a very small group of supporters to stay in power, and, thus, have 
much greater latitude in conducting policy. Therefore, autocrats can call the shots on aid to some 
extent because they can respond to any decrease in aid with the removal of policy concessions, 
and democratic regimes cannot politically afford to lose policy concessions (Bueno de Mesquita 
& Smith 2011: 173). Additionally, the power recipients hold over donors—the realization that 
donors are unlikely to remove aid suddenly—enables recipients to misspend large amounts of aid 
(Boutton 2014: 742). 
Donor countries have increasingly touted the objective of democratization, or the 
institution of democratic regimes in developing countries and countries that host terrorist groups. 
However, according to Bueno de Mesquita & Smith (2011: 193), applying the aid-for-policy 
deals framework, it seems unlikely that this is the actual goal of democratic donor countries 
because, just like the demands of constituents, democratic regimes prefer “compliant foreign 
regimes to democratic ones.” With true democratization comes the possibility of an anti-donor 
(in many cases anti-American) regime being elected, and this possibility can be politically 
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frightening for the donor regime to the extent that they take action to prevent meaningful 
democratization from occurring (Bueno de Mesquita & Smith 2009: 193). 
Foreign aid is rarely allocated according to counterterrorism or developmental need, and 
the political survival of both the donor and recipient regimes is the primary catalyst for 
allocation. That being said, some aid ​is​ devoted to counterterrorism efforts, though research on 
its effectiveness is mixed and depends on a number of factors. 
 
Part 2: Foreign Aid Effectiveness 
Some theorists, such as Azam & Thelen (2012), argue that foreign aid is an effective 
counterterrorism tool, even within the premise of aid-for-policy deals. Furthermore, Azam & 
Thelen (2012: 2-3) argue that, from an empirical perspective, donor countries generally allocate 
aid with counterterrorism as their primary objective, and that this has “a significant impact on the 
number of terrorist attacks produced by recipient countries.” In Africa, economic aid has been 
observed to be an effective tool against terrorism, as well as other high-level crimes; however, 
the cost of effective counterterrorism is much higher than what is generally recognized (Baggott 
2011). 
Others disagree. Tahir (2017: 126) goes so far as to argue that not only does foreign aid 
fail to reduce domestic conflict in the recipient country, but that “aid causes conflict.” Tahir 
(2017) attributes this to aid acting as a separate source of income for recipient regimes, making 
them reliant on a smaller constituency. Thus, the recipient country’s political system moves in 
the opposite direction of democratization. This position is supported by real-world evidence, 
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such as the fact that foreign aid expanded—rather than limited—insurgencies in Pakistan during 
the War on Terror (Nasir et al. 2012). 
Taking Pakistan as an example, American foreign aid has been generally ineffective in 
combating the Taliban, the largest terrorist group based in Pakistan. One reason for this is that 
only a small portion of allocated aid was ever used for counterterrorism objectives: according to 
Bueno de Mesquita & Smith (2011: 164), “the United States gave Pakistan $6.6 billion in 
military aid to combat the Taliban between 2001 and 2008. Only $500 million is estimated to 
have ever reached the army.” 
Instead, much of the foreign aid was devoted to expanding Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and 
security capabilities in anticipation of a conflict with India, Pakistan’s largest regional rival 
(Boutton 2014: 741). Pakistan is not alone in this tendency, as, more broadly, recipient countries 
have no motivation to not invest counterterrorism aid in regional rivalries, and rivalries can be 
much more politically important for recipient regimes than fighting domestic insurgencies 
(Boutton 2014: 742). According to Boutton (2014: 742), aid can become a lifeline for autocratic 
regimes to the extent that “in some cases, the presence of a domestic security threat in a country 
can be a strategic benefit for a government.” 
The consequence of aid being a boon for recipient regimes not just in interstate rivalries 
but also in eliminating domestic political rivals and consolidating power is that there is little 
incentive for them to eliminate terrorist groups. Because donor countries give aid as long as the 
campaign against terrorist groups is ongoing, there is an incentive for recipient countries to draw 
out the conflict for as long as possible (Bapat May 2011: 2). Put another way, according to Bapat 
(October 2011: 316), the problem of moral hazard is such that an inefficiency is produced where 
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“America pays hosts to fight terrorism, even though these states are unlikely to disarm their 
terrorists.” Compounding the problem of moral hazard is the fact that, as mentioned previously, 
democratic donor regimes are unlikely to remove aid suddenly (Boutton 2016: 366). This assures 
recipient regimes that they have a near-blank check in their use of aid funds. 
However, foreign aid can be effective in catalyzing economic development in democratic 
states that have good governance and policy and where aid flows to the regime are held 
accountable. A prime example of this is the Marshall Plan in the 1940s, as democratic 
institutions were already established and recipient regimes could not interfere with the 
distribution of aid by American armed forces (Tahir 2017: 113). 
Furthermore, according to Bueno de Mesquita & Smith (2011: 182), aid can be effective 
if the regime is held to account in how it is spent: “We know that aid works much better in the 
presence of good governance (just as we know that more often than not it goes to places with bad 
governance).” Because democratic regimes are held to account by their constituents when 
receiving aid, their constituents act as a critical oversight, ensuring that aid money is spent on 
counterterrorism efforts (Boutton 2016: 362). 
In contrast, in personalist recipient regimes where there is no party structure supporting 
the dictator, aid is supremely vital to the survival of the regime. In a personalist state, the dictator 
is not free to use the military to crush dissent, as to do so would be to allow the military to gain 
power and become a potential rival. Therefore, to pay off supporters and maintain loyalty, the 
dictator needs aid as a source of income (Boutton 2016: 362-366). In this scenario, aid is not 
used for counterterrorism purposes, it props up an autocratic regime and prolongs insurgencies, 
making foreign aid completely counterproductive. This scenario is reflected in the real world: 
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according to Boutton (2016: 379), “Higher average US aid levels lead to longer-lasting terrorist 
campaigns in personalist regimes. Similarly, increasing aid levels to personalist regimes leads to 
more terrorist attacks—especially anti-US attacks—in a given year.” 
One last reason why counterterrorism foreign aid may be ineffective is that it does not 
address the root cause of terrorism—economic and social inequality (Farooq & Shahzad 2019: 
330). Inequality, as well as political corruption, drives radicalization and, eventually, insurgency. 
Therefore, according to Farooq & Shahzad (2019: 330), any solution to terrorism should “reduce 
economic and social disparities…” In addition, as economic indicators such as unemployment 
rate correspond to conflict, counterterrorism should focus on increasing social spending in host 
countries with the goal of providing better employment opportunities across the socio-economic 





Counterterrorism foreign aid has been largely ineffective in combating insurgencies 
around the world because of the problem of moral hazard and the mis-incentivization of 
prolonging conflict rather than resolving it. However, aid has been successful in preventing 
terrorist takeovers of states, as it has prevented recipient regimes from negotiating with 
insurgency groups (Bapat May 2011: 2). This suggests that the objective of counterterrorism aid 
is primarily to influence recipient countries to become more accommodating toward the foreign 
policy objectives of donor nations, rather than to eliminate international terrorist threats. Finally, 
in determining the allocation of aid within the international system, government and regime type 
of both the recipient and donor nations is critical in determining the motivations of both actors in 
the aid-for-policy equation. 
This paper does not provide many solutions, though there is a fair amount of existing 
research on the subject (Boutton 2016; Bueno de Mesquita & Smith 2011; Farooq & Shahzad 
2019; Iyengar et al. 2011). Deprivation Theory, which identifies economic deprivation as the 
primary catalyst for the emergence of terrorism (Tahir 2017: 115), is one area of research not 
investigated in this paper, but connecting the theory to possible solutions may be an important 
topic for future reseach. 
Additionally, another area that could be a potential target for future investigation is 
Selectorate Theory, which is described and advocated for by Bueno de Mesquita & Smith; this 
theory could be much expanded upon, especially in regard to the War on Terror. Selectorate 
Theory gets to the heart of the counterterrorism problem in an analytical and comprehensive way 
and further research could develop it into a compelling position.  
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For my entire life, the United States has constantly been at war, primarily as a part of the 
ongoing War on Terror. Determining the efficacy of various counterterrorism strategies is 
paramount both to understanding the U.S. effort to succeed in the conflict and to holding 
American politicians accountable. American foreign policy ultimately comes down to the voters, 
as they determine the leadership of the regime and the nation’s policy agenda. As such, the 
electorate must be educated on the effectiveness of foreign policy strategies. Tens of thousands 
of lives in the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa are in the hands of American voters, making 
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